

Blockchain Performance Benchmarking: a VCG Auction Smart Contract Use Case for Ethereum and Tezos (Short Paper)

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Abstract

The second generation of blockchains introduces the notion of "smart contract" to decentralized ledgers, but with each new blockchain system comes different consensus mechanisms or different approaches on how to assess the cost of computation inside the chain, both aspects that affect the efficiency of the systems as a decentralized computer. We present an experimental comparison of two blockchain systems, namely Ethereum and Tezos, from the perspective of smart contracts, centered around the same implementation of a VCG for Sponsored Search auction algorithm, respectively encoded in Solidity and SmartPy. Our analysis shows the feasibility of implementing an algorithm for sponsored search in such an environment while providing information on how useful these systems can be for this type of smart contracts.

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1 Introduction

The presence of "smart contracts", i.e., distributed code snippets, into recent blockchain architectures such as Ethereum [10], EOS [4] or Tezos [3] calls for a comparative performance analysis of their implementations, in terms of running time, storage requirements or cost. Even if some benchmarking work has been done previously, see for instance [7] and [6], we are not aware of work performing a comparative analysis of smart contracts. We report here on preliminary results of such a comparison on two architectures, Ethereum and Tezos, using a real-life use case, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction for sponsored search (VCG) algorithm.

Our motivation for designing this particular benchmark setting is two-fold. First, we opted to focus on blockchains adhering to different philosophies, the popular and proof-of-work-based Ethereum and the newer and proof-of-stake-based Tezos, to better assess the performance characteristics of the blockchain ecosystem. Second, our choice of the VCG algorithm is driven by its importance for search-engine and social-network companies, where

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41 advertisements are the main source of revenues. Since these systems, like Facebook, have
42 to mitigate their bottom line and their users' satisfaction, they often opt for this particular
43 type of auction to sell their ads slots, since there advertisers can indeed bid according to
44 their perceived value of each targeted user.

45 The importance of the reliability and openness of VCG-based ad bidding processes make
46 them a potentially valuable application for smart contracts. In the rest of this paper, we
47 introduce the Ethereum and Tezos approaches to smart contracts (Section 2), specify the
48 VCG algorithm and its implementation as a smart contract (Section 3), present our test
49 protocol (Section 4), detail our metrics and main results on both Ethereum and Tezos
50 (Section 5), discuss our main findings (Section 6) and finally conclude (Section 7).

51 **2 Ethereum and Tezos Smart Contracts**

52 After its introduction in 2008 with Satoshi Nakamoto's Bitcoin paper, blockchain systems
53 evolved and gained functionalities on top of the peer-to-peer exchange of value. The second
54 generation of blockchains, kick-started by Ethereum, added Turing-complete computation to
55 their offerings, making decentralized applications (dApps) a possibility, via so-called "smart
56 contracts". A smart contract is an autonomous agent that runs on a blockchain and can
57 implement a wide range of applications.

58 Ethereum is currently the second largest blockchain system, and the first choice for dApps.
59 Its blocks are produced by miners, and the consensus on this blockchain is achieved via the
60 Ethash proof-of-work protocol. Ethereum smart contracts are written in Solidity, a high-level
61 language influenced by C++, Python and JavaScript. Its compiler targets the Ethereum
62 Virtual Machine (EVM), generating EVM opcodes to be executed. Each of these opcodes
63 has a gas cost associated, related to how much computation it requires or storage it manages.
64 Whenever someone tries to execute a transaction to a smart contract, it is necessary to
65 provide a gas limit and a gas price in ETH or Gwei ($1.0 \text{ ETH} = 10^9 \text{ Gwei}$) as parameters
66 for the transaction. A miner will execute the transaction until its completion or it runs out
67 of gas, while the user will be debited by the amount of gas used multiplied by the current
68 gas price. Gas is important to insure that the system will not get bogged down by a single
69 contract execution, or be vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, as well as functioning as a
70 reward system for the miners. There is a gas limit for each block mined, which is voted by
71 the miners; currently, it is 1.25×10^7 . As there is a limit to the amount of gas, miners will
72 give preference to transactions with a high price of gas.

73 Tezos is a third-generation blockchain that intends to address the cost, energy and
74 scalability issues generated by the proof-of-work approach. It uses proof of stake as its
75 consensus mechanism. Funded by the second largest Initial Coin Offering in 2017, Tezos is
76 characterized by its self-amending properties and its proof-of-stake consensus mechanism.
77 Tezos presents a particular case of proof of stake, in which the ability to produce blocks
78 ("baking", in Tezos terminology) can be delegated to another entity, so the name "delegated
79 proof of stake". Bakers do not need to perform work as in Ethereum, but rely on access
80 rights linked to "coins" valued in XTZ. Tezos also has a different gas system than Ethereum.
81 A user is charged for each transaction in two different ways: a fee, which is credited to
82 the block baker, and a certain amount of burned coins, sent to an unreachable account.
83 For performing a transaction, a user needs to provide a fee (in XTZ) and a gas limit; the
84 transaction will then compete with other transactions to be added to a block, taking into
85 account two limitations, namely hard block gas limit (10,400,000 gas) and hard operation
86 gas limit (1,040,000 gas). Bakers then choose transactions, assuming that gas fits the block

87 and fees respect a minimum. When the size of the blockchain storage increases due to a
 88 transaction, the sender must pay a “burn”, in XTZ. This happens when a contract storage
 89 increases (storage burn) or when a new contract is put on the chain (allocation burn).

90 **3 VCG for Sponsored Search Smart Contract**

91 VCG for Sponsored Search (VCG) is a specialization of the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction
 92 mechanism dedicated to the sale of sponsored links. In this version, the goods being auctioned
 93 are “slots” in a web page, and the buyers are advertisers interested in putting one of their
 94 ads in a slot. Each slot is associated to a click-through rate (“ctr”), a measure of the number
 95 of clicks advertisers can be expected to receive on their ads per number of impressions.

96 The VCG algorithm, in which n bidders vie for k slots, each characterized with a ctr α_j ,
 97 can be outlined as follows, where the ctrs α_j are assumed down sorted [8]:

- 98 1. accept a bid b_i from each bidder i , and relabel the bidders so that $b_1 \geq b_2 \geq \dots \geq b_n$;
- 99 2. assign each bidder i of the k first bidders to the i -th slot (the others lose);
- 100 3. charge each such bidder a price $p_i = \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \sum_{j=i+1}^{k+1} b_j (\alpha_{j-1} - \alpha_j)$, with $\alpha_{k+1} = 0$.

101 Intuitively, the price (per click) p_i paid by the bidder i is designed to compensate the
 102 loss in “social welfare” suffered by all the other bidders by the mere presence of the bidder i .
 103 In the framework of search engines, such a VCG algorithm must be run each time a web
 104 page is about to be displayed on a computer, meaning billions of times per day.

105 Implementing VCG as a smart contract varies according to whether one targets Ethereum
 106 (Solidity) or Tezos (SmartPy). We strove to have similar code for both implementations to
 107 make the comparison as fair as possible, and use the Solidity version for reference here (the
 108 full implementation is available at https://github.com/LucasMSg/VCG_SmartContracts).

109 **Storage**

110 The following data structures are used to implement VCG (`uint` denotes unsigned integers):

- 111 ■ `owner(address)`, the Tezos address of the user who owns the auction smart contract;
- 112 ■ `isOpen(bool)`, a flag indicating if an auction is opened at the moment or not;
- 113 ■ `ctrs(uint[])`, the array of ctrs of the slots being auctioned;
- 114 ■ `bids(uint[])`, the bids sent by the advertisers;
- 115 ■ `agents(address[])`, the Tezos addresses of the advertisers;
- 116 ■ `prices(uint[])`, the prices computed at the end of the auction.

117 **Public functions**

118 Here are the main public functions (entry points, in SmartPy) of a VCG contract (only `bid`
 119 is not reserved to the contract owner):

- 120 ■ `transferOwnership` transfers the contract ownership;
- 121 ■ `updateCTRs` updates the `ctrs` array, if an auction is not under way;
- 122 ■ `openAuction` opens an auction, providing it an initial `ctrs` array argument;
- 123 ■ `bid` receives one bid from a participant (the bid and bidder’s address are registered);
- 124 ■ `cancelAuction` cancels the auction (the bids and agents are erased);
- 125 ■ `closeAuction` closes the auction, sorts the bid list and computes the VCG prices.

126 **4 Test Protocol**

127 Both blockchain development environments provide editors to test contracts, but these
128 tests are being simulated in a sandbox blockchain [2] and are thus not present in an actual
129 blockchain. To provide performance results more representative of actual blockchains, we
130 tested the VCG contract in so-called “testnets”, i.e., Ropsten for Ethereum and Delphinnet
131 for Tezos. This way we can expect to experience the behavior of a full-fledged blockchain
132 without having to pay transaction fees. To deploy and communicate with contracts, we use
133 Truffle, a development environment for smart contracts initially developed for Ethereum, but
134 for which a Tezos integration, though still under development, presents enough functionalities
135 for our tests. Truffle’s contract abstraction provides means to interact with contracts using
136 JavaScript.

137 We implemented a unit test that performs the following transactions on each blockchain:
138 deployment of a VCG smart contract, opening of an auction, sending of bids (to simulate
139 participants) and finally auction closure, producing a table of winners. We opted to deploy a
140 new contract each time the test is performed to better track the possible cost incurred by
141 the addition of more storage to a contract (e.g., the burned XTZ for Tezos). Our full test
142 consists then of a series of unit test auctions with increasing numbers of participants and
143 slots, namely 10 participants with 4 and 8 slots, 20 participants with 4, 8 and 16 slots and
144 50 participants with 4 slots. We stopped our tests after 50 participants and 4 slots because
145 it was already enough to reach the gas limit of a Ropsten block. We note n_m an auction
146 with n participants and m slots.

147 We focused the collection of test data on the most important factors that generally
148 characterize the dynamic performance of contracts. Our use of Truffle also limited the scope
149 of metrics we could put our hands on. For Ethereum, we measured gas usage, setting a large
150 value for both the gas limit and the price to ensure that our transactions would be chosen by
151 the miners and also have enough resources to run our contract to completion (in particular,
152 when closing auctions). For Tezos, Truffle automatically sets the fee and gas limit; at the
153 end of the test, we get the actual gas used and the number of burned coins for the execution
154 of the test contract.

155 **5 Results**

156 **Metrics selection**

157 Our comparison experiment focuses on programmability (see next subsection), performance
158 and cost issues. In view of the data available through Truffle and the blockchains’ APIs, we
159 selected gas and burned, blocktime and cost in dollars as metrics for our comparison’s para-
160 meters. Gas and burned are used for computation (CPU, storage) performance assessment;
161 they also illustrate how both platforms units of gas are not directly comparable. “Wall-clock”
162 execution time could be considered as the time performance parameter, but when working
163 with smart contracts, since it is directly linked to each blockchain’s block time, we consider
164 the latter as our time comparison parameter. Finally, monetary considerations are strongly
165 linked to blockchain technologies, so we look at cost issues. Cost is, in some sense, a better
166 parameter for comparison than the previous ones, since it is a good indicator of the practical
167 usability of smart contracts and blockchains.

168 Programmability

169 An important though somewhat subjective point of comparison between the two blockchain
170 environments is the ease of programming and interacting with smart contracts. Ethereum's
171 main language for writing smart contracts is Solidity, similar to Java and C++. Ethereum
172 provides a good IDE, Remix, with the possibility to execute transactions broken down by
173 EVM op-codes and follow the changes in storage and gas consumption. On the other hand,
174 Tezos offers four languages for smart contracts, including Michelson, the stack-based language
175 that is, in the end, executed inside its blockchain. We opted for SmartPy, a Python library;
176 scripts are then regular Python scripts that use SmartPy constructs. SmartPy relies on
177 meta-programming, which may present a steeper learning curve for developers than Solidity.

178 For deployment and interaction with Ethereum contracts, we used Truffle, a well-
179 documented tool; thanks to its many tutorials for setting up configurations, it poses few
180 problems. Tezos, however, proved more difficult to put to use. We started with Tezster-CLI,
181 a specific tool for Tezos's contracts, which happened to be not adaptable to our serial unit
182 tests. We ended up switching to Truffle for Tezos, which, while still experimental, proved
183 resilient enough for this experiment.

184 Gas and Burned

185 The experimental data obtained vary significantly according to the phase of the VCG auction
186 process and the blockchain on which they run.

187 **Deployment.** On both blockchains, the gas for each deployment of a VCG contract is always
188 the same. Ethereum consumes 1,016,192 gas, while Tezos needs 24,017 gas while charging
189 1.183 XTZ for the allocation of 4,475 bytes.

190 **Opening.** When opening an auction, the ctrs are stored in the blockchain. As can be
191 expected, the gas and burned increase linearly with the number of slots being auctioned.


192 **Bidding.** Bids behave differently on each blockchain. Ethereum is more homogeneous, with
193 the first `bid` transaction always needing more gas, since the first `push` sets up the storage
194 for the array of bids and agents. The first bid consumes 105,917 gas, while the subsequent
195 bids, having only to insert a `uint` and an address, always consume 75,917 gas.

196 For Tezos, gas consumption increases with a mean of 208.2 ± 1.1 (s.d.) with each
197 subsequent bid, while the amount of coins burned is constantly 0.00925 XTZ or 0.0095
198 XTZ, depending on the size of the bid.

199 **Closing.** The close auction function/entry-point is the most relevant for our comparison,
200 since the bulk of the VCG algorithm is performed here. The array of bids is sorted (we
201 implemented a simple insertion-sort algorithm), and this sorted array is used in the third
202 step of the VCG algorithm in order to compute the prices for the winners. Figure 1 is a
203 graph of the closing gas for each of our tests. Note that it was not possible to close the
204 50 bids auction in Ethereum, the gas surpassing what the Ropsten network is accepting
205 as gas limit for a single auction.

206 Block time

207 For Ethereum's main network, using Etherscan, we measured the block time at 14.82 ± 1.63
208 (in seconds), while the Ropsten network clocks at 14.5 ± 1.2 seconds. Measuring Ropsten
209 directly from Truffle, we got a mean of 14.16 ± 7.72 . For Tezos, its main network is advertised
210 as providing a constant block time of 60 seconds, while Delphinnet uses half of it, i.e., 30
211 seconds. Using Truffle, our tests on Tezos showed a block time of 43.07 ± 14.63 seconds.
212 Note that we are not waiting for the suggested confirmation blocks.



■ **Figure 1** For each VCG contract n_m closing transaction, gas consumption on Ethereum (left) and gas, fee and burned for Tezos (right, where the Y axis scale is in gas and μ XTZ).

213 Price

214 For our experiment, coins on testnets are free, so the ETH and XTZ amounts that were spent
 215 for this benchmarking had no actual value. Yet, an approximate prediction of the prices one
 216 would have to pay to run our VCG test can be obtained by taking the main network prices
 217 for both of these coins. At the time of this writing (Mar 10 2021, 10:24 UTC), one ETH is
 218 valued at \$1,827, and one XTZ is \$4.25.

219 For Ethereum, we used ETH Gas Station (ethgasstation.info) to get a quote for gas
 220 prices. For test purposes, we used the price category “Standard” (91 Gwei/gas, at the time
 221 of test), which led to the following prices for the deployment and bidding phases: \$168.94,
 222 and \$17.6 (first bid) and \$12.6 (subsequent ones). The varying closing phase prices can be
 223 deduced from Figure 1; for instance, the price for a 10_4 auction was \$128.26.

224 For Tezos, we used as transaction fees the ones automatically suggested by Truffle, while
 225 the burned costs, related to storage increments, are 0.00025 XTZ for 1 byte at the time
 226 of test, for both the main and testnets. The prices for the deployment phase are \$0.03 for
 227 fee and \$5.02 for burned. For the bidding phase, the fee paid by each bidder increases by
 228 \$0.000088 \pm 0.0000029 each time, while the burned remains somewhat constant, between
 229 \$0.039 and \$0.04. For the closing phase, one can refer to Figure 1 to get an estimate, where,
 230 for a 10_4 auction, the fee paid by the auctioneer would be \$0.133 and the burned, \$0.028.

231 6 Discussion

232 Our goal with this benchmarking study was to compare the performance of two very similar
 233 smart contracts on Ethereum and Tezos. Translating a Solidity contract to the Tezos
 234 blockchain environment proved to be quite difficult, even though this could be somewhat
 235 expected since Ethereum is the most popular dApps platform, with thus a lot of support
 236 from its community, while Tezos is much less used for now. From our experience, most
 237 complications with Tezos are inherent to its design philosophy. In particular, the self-
 238 amending property of this blockchain translates into testnets being abandoned every time
 239 there is a new protocol upgrade (every 4 months or so, based on our experience), which led
 240 to temporary complications for our study, either because of bugs or because some tools were
 241 not adapted to the new testnet as fast as expected.

242 Ethereum’s scalability is a big drawback for our VCG implementation. The gas limit
 243 for blocks implies a very small limit for the number of bidders, especially when compared
 244 to standard VCG auctions in industry. Adding the system’s popularity to the scalability

245 problems is rising gas prices, which results in a high average transaction fee of \$39.49 (recorded
246 in February 23, 2021). These values could be considered acceptable for a transfer-value
247 system, but, for a dApps platform, they could lead to users abandoning the system. However,
248 the EIP 1559 [1] proposal to reform the Ethereum fee market and the introduction of a
249 proof-of-stake approach within Ethereum 2.0 are two welcoming changes that could positively
250 impact the Ethereum results in our benchmarking.

251 The idea of implementing VCG as a smart contract, though initially appealing due to
252 the archival nature of blockchains and the transparency of its data processing, had some
253 less positive implications. The main one is that all data in a public blockchain is public,
254 which goes against the sealed-bid requirement of VCG. We intend to address this issue in the
255 future, via the inclusion of cryptography contracts similar to [5]. But even if one assumes
256 that bidders are not able to access the blockchain to see the other bids, the bid transaction
257 receipt automatically returned by Ethereum and Tezos could still be used to inform the
258 bidder about the current status of the auction, since, for instance, a big gas consumption for
259 Ethereum means that one has been the first bidder, while the always increasing prices for
260 bids in Tezos can help subsequent bidders in figuring out better strategies.

261 Another hindrance of blockchains for auctions is the total time being linked to the block
262 time. In an actual VCG for sponsored search setting, auctions are made in matters of seconds,
263 which means that a smart contract is not viable for such an application, except maybe in
264 very limited domains (high-value auctioned items among few participants, for instance as in
265 a country-level energy market).

266 **7 Conclusion**

267 We present a comparative bench-marking use case for smart contracts on the proof-of-work
268 Ethereum and proof-of-stake Tezos blockchains. Our test is based on the VCG auction
269 mechanism widely used in the search-engine industry for advertisement placement, an
270 application that might be thought to be able to profit from the trust and good governance
271 practices blockchains bring to computations. Our experimental data suggest however that,
272 currently, time and space performances (and price, mostly on Ethereum) prevent this type
273 of application to be put most of the time to practical use.

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